It is common to hear Māori discuss primordial states of Being, yet in colonisation those very central beliefs are forced into weaker utterances. In this process those utterances merely conform to a colonised agenda. ‘Mātauranga’, a tidy term that overwhelmingly refers to an epistemological knowing of the world, colludes nicely with its English equivalent, ‘knowledge’, to further colonise those core contemplations of Being. Its plausibility relies on an orderly regard of things in the world. In education, historical and current practices (...) of schooling pave the way for things in the world so that they amount to mātauranga for Māori, and even the term ‘ako’ will conspire in its own way. Both Novalis and Heidegger have the ability to identify subtly colonising philosophies, and may even propose some theoretical solutions for Māori. (shrink)

In the face of land confiscations and other forms of imperialism characteristic of the 19th century in Aotearoa/new Zealand, the second Maori King Tawhiao devised a number of sayings that seem at first glance to be entirely mythical. Highly metaphorical and poetic, they appear to refer, as Bakhtin would have it in his discussion of the epic, to a language that is emotional, innately tied to a static mooring of pre-rational thought. Yet, in this paper we argue that a Maori (...) metaphysics complicates the delineations between primordial and novelistic language. Indeed, there is in a Maori worldview the notion that a term contains to it both postcolonial and mythical traces at once. Thus each apparently primordial term is tinged with the realities of colonised experience, even if they seem concrete and self-referential. In this paper we address those multiple voices in light of Bakhtin’s philosophies on heteroglossia, and argue that the accusation of ‘myth’ in relation to Tawhiao’s sayings is possible yet does not accommodate the metaphysics founding the sayings. We speculate that there is a form of freedom in Tawhiao’s words that exists regardless of our interpretation but that calls to be unearthed through an open reading. Sir Robert Mahuta, prominent Tainui leader, is one who has already indicated the need for a heteroglossic reading of Tawhiao. We then move to a description of the Waikato-Tainui College for Research and Development as it attempts to carry out this heteroglossic reading of Maori political and metaphysical text and utterance. (shrink)

For Māori, a real opportunity exists to flesh out some terms and concepts that Western thinkers have adopted and that precede disciplines but necessarily inform them. In this article, we are intent on describing one of these precursory phenomena—Foucault’s Gaze—within a framework that accords with a Māori philosophical framework. Our discussion is focused on the potential and limits of colonised thinking, which has huge implications for such disciplines as education, among others. We have placed Foucault’s Gaze alongside a Māori metaphysics (...) and have speculated on the Gaze’s surveillant/expectant strategies with some key Māori primordial phenomena in mind, such as ‘te kore’ and ‘āhua’. We posit the Gaze as an entity and thus aim to render it more relevant to Māori, so that it can be addressed appropriately. We also preface that discussion by theorising on some of the challenges that confront us as Māori authors in even referring counter-colonially to the Gaze. Whilst we do not seek to destabilise the Gaze by positing it as a metaphysically based entity, we do hint at the possibility that critical indigenous philosophy may even for a short time bring the Gaze into focus for Māori. By introducing an awareness of an alternative metaphysics, we may have unsettled the self-certainty of the Gaze. (shrink)

Where has all the hilarity gone – and, with it, the ethics of the dark? In this article, I engage with our metaphysical entities of darkness (in Maori, Te Po) and nothingness (Te Kore). Undermining and re-declaring (only to un-declare once again) are more than just pleasurable exercise for my own indigenous group – Maori; they are ethical necessities that keep one’s certainties in check. Whether it is agreeable or uncomfortable, this acknowledgement of those first beings is necessary if we (...) are to avoid taking ourselves too seriously. I then consider one controversial statement about trauma and lend my perverse, indigenous sense to it, reinterpret it and recalibrate it in light of our inherent fallibility as human citizens who are always destabilised by our own metaphysical entities. This drive to undercut ourselves by making our statements contingent on other things, I shall argue, is an ethical one. (shrink)

Novalis, the Early German Romantic poet and philosopher, had at the core of his work a mysterious depiction of the ‘absolute’. The absolute is Novalis’ name for a substance that defies precise knowledge yet calls for a tentative and sensitive speculation. How one asserts a truth, represents an object, and sets about encountering things in the world, is in the first instance the domain of the absolute, which diffuses through all things in the world. In this article, I begin by (...) describing the absolute in general and I outline its importance in Novalis’ works. I then speculate on its natural tendency to render an object mysterious and fundamentally unknowable. Although the absolute also allows us an insight into an object, my attention in this article is drawn to its concealment in mystery because, as Novalis was at pains to indicate, the Enlightenment has been more than generous to the clear perception of an object. I turn to consider the poet—a most important political character in Novalis’ works—and their Bildung of themselves and their communities. They bring their communities to continual maturation through their role in romanticising the ordinary world and through their need to consistently reflect on, and be aware of, the absolute. They also develop themselves in their ongoing state of mystery as they carry out their political and poetic responsibility. (shrink)

Providing an indigenous opinion on anything is a difficult task. To be sure, there is a multitude of possible indigenous responses to dominant Western philosophy. My aim in this paper is to assess dominant analytic Western philosophy in light of the general insistence of most indigenous authors that indigenous metaphysics is holistic, and to make some bold claims about both dominant Western philosophy in line with an indigenous metaphysics of holism. There will, of course, be different ways of expressing holism (...) according to the indigenous group, but most of the literature states, as a most basic concern, that a general indigenous philosophy is concerned with the groundedness of an individual as an entity related to and indivisible from the rest of the world.1 The consequences of any assertion about the holistic nature of metaphysics are vast, including for the interpretation of what is often perceived of as the antithesis: Western philosophy. (shrink)

Carl Mika claims in the symposium’s lead essay that we need more myth today. In fact, an “unscientific” attitude can potentially reorient the alienation from the world. For Mika, a philosophical mātauranga Māori incorporates such a way of being in the world. Through it, an unmediated and co-existent relationship with the world can be built up. Some of Mika’s co-symposiasts invite Mika to substantiate aspects about this bold claim. Carwyn Jones nudges Mika to discuss (...) the parallels between tikanga Māori—a system that seeks to incorporate Māori law—and the common-law tradition that is adopted in New Zealand today. W. Julian Korab-Karpowicz agrees with Mika that to understand the world through an indifferent “scientific” investigation is to understand the world only partially, while the Māori scientist Ocean Ripeka Mercier illustrates how she seeks to develop a third space in her work that reconciles the fear of the unknown with the propensity to control the world through knowing. Helen Verran invites Mika to think about whether, and how, his understanding of a philosophical mātauranga Māori can help to facilitate the cultivation of a naturalism that is able to generate a cosmopolitics in New Zealand. (shrink)

The experience of researching as a Māori student within academia will often raise questions about how and whether the student’s research privileges Māori world views and articulates culturally specific epistemologies. This study offers some theorising, from the perspectives of a Maori doctoral student and her Maori supervisor, on the metaphysical nature of research for Maori. It emphasises that there is a space for speculative, creative and responsive thinking as a central method in the student’s doctoral research and describes how access (...) to free thinking has been only partly recognised in currently dominant methods of research. We describe this approach as ‘whakaaro’, and note its relationship to language itself, to the researcher and the interviewee, and in particular to the researcher’s intuitive and largely unknowable response to what an interviewee utters. In that act, the student envisages that she will expansively hint at the deep expression of the profoundly mysterious. Here, our thinking resonates with various Western and indigenous writings about research and adumbrates the potential of the whakaaro method without foreclosing against its various permutations. (shrink)

Where has all the hilarity gone – and, with it, the ethics of the dark? In this article, I engage with our metaphysical entities of darkness and nothingness. Undermining and re-declaring are more than just pleasurable exercise for my own indigenous group – Maori; they are ethical necessities that keep one’s certainties in check. Whether it is agreeable or uncomfortable, this acknowledgement of those first beings is necessary if we are to avoid taking ourselves too seriously. I then consider one (...) controversial statement about trauma and lend my perverse, indigenous sense to it, reinterpret it and recalibrate it in light of our inherent fallibility as human citizens who are always destabilised by our own metaphysical entities. This drive to undercut ourselves by making our statements contingent on other things, I shall argue, is an ethical one. (shrink)

Drawing on select works of Adorno, we will first rehearse his reasons for a rejuvenation of philosophy and apply them to philosophers working on world philosophical traditions. We will then analyse Adorno’s arguments pertaining to the theory–praxis relation to ascertain whether his thought could accommodate a study of world philosophical traditions for the simple reason that they are present in a particular society. Shifting our focus slightly, we reflect upon how current ways of professional philosophizing affect the study of world (...) philosophical traditions. As the example of Māori philosophy demonstrates, current philosophical practices seem to delimit the search for the unconventional in academic philosophy. Through its philosophical appropriation, the so-called unconventional tends to mimic conventional patterns in academic philosophy. We will then attempt to find reasons to critique this process within the Adornoian framework itself. The conclusion draws together different strands of the discussion and delineates some paths to take forward the world philosophies project in an Adornoian spirit. (shrink)

In this response, I briefly consider a Maori philosophy of reaction and disconnection, relating to certain Pakeha New Zealanders’ vehement, sometimes mocking, rejection of Maori spiritual entities (such as the taniwha). While Maori are often publicly reported on as being outraged at this rejection, what is not so widely cited is the concern that many Maori have at the rangirua (fundamentally fragmented) state that these individuals occupy. I suggest that rangirua engages with notions of control, to the extent that the (...) mocking individual is so highly concerned with disavowing the spiritual that implications arise for what is, from a Maori perspective, their wellbeing. Kingsbury argues for a particular kind of reality for the taniwha but not from Maori foundational propositions of existence. Her argument draws from the rules that are credible for analytic philosophy but not so much for a Maori perspective. Nevertheless, within those limitations, she argues well for a notion of taniwha that could make taniwha palatable for those Pakeha individuals. (shrink)

In Maori thought, the possibility exists for a sort of lateral thinking that does not necessarily directly respond to another’s utterance or opinion but that considers some of the creative and arbitrary themes that arise. In this article, I employ this counter-colonial speculation, keeping in mind a Maori worldview whilst thinking in the wake of Elizabeth Rata’s “Ethnic Ideologies in New Zealand Education: What’s Wrong with Kaupapa Maori?” The speculative powers that Maori have at our disposal here have undoubtedly been (...) employed in a number of ways throughout Maori history; here, I use them in a way that does not directly respond to a prompt. Although Rata’s true aim is to critique kaupapa Maori, she inadvertently brings my attention to a particular characteristic of her writing—the suffix -ism. The fact that it saturates her writing in this article leads me to consider the broader issues associated with instrumentalist language, and the impact of the -ism on a Maori relationship with things in the world. It emerges that, although Rata may be controversial for Maori in her views, her writing is useful for some unintended reasons, as it prompts some thinking around the appropriateness of the -ism for Maori. (shrink)

Where does the object or idea begin, and where does it end as ‘unseen’? There is scope in Maori philosophising to think of the seen object or its idea in various ways, including as materially constituting the self and the rest of the world; as incomplete for a mental representation; as constituted in itself by the unseen ; and as co-constitutional with nothingness and presence. The possibilities of the seen object are several, especially if the concept of ‘seen’ is understood (...) as immediately determined by its other. This paper considers the consequences of the seen and unseen and the illogical in Maori thought for ‘teach-learn’ and in particular for the translation of teach-learn as ‘ako’ in the Maori language. It also discusses some possibilities for the term ‘porangi’, which is often quoted in relation to ‘madness’ but has deeper metaphysical potential that combines the reality of gloom/unseen alongside a heady potential. I refer to this phenomenon as ‘giddying abjection’ and turn it towards unpicking the certainty that ako as teach-learn replicates. Porangi can refer to self-derision, and I take certain statements of mine and destabilise them from their certainty. In that act I hope to show that students and scholars could follow a similar path with their own statements and, in so doing, subject their own utterances to madness. (shrink)

This article begins by accepting that strategic ignorance, or agnotology, underpins academic practice and perpetuates the systemic disadvantage experienced on a global level by non-White and Indige...

Michael A PetersBeijing Normal UniversityChatGPT is an AI chatbot released by OpenAI on November 30, 2022 and a ‘stable release’ on February 13, 2023. It belongs to OpenAI’s GPT-3 family (generativ...

Drawing on select works of Adorno, we will first rehearse his reasons for a rejuvenation of philosophy and apply them to philosophers working on world philosophical traditions. We will then analyse Adorno’s arguments pertaining to the theory–praxis relation to ascertain whether his thought could accommodate a study of world philosophical traditions for the simple reason that they are present in a particular society. Shifting our focus slightly, we reflect upon how current ways of professional philosophizing affect the study of world (...) philosophical traditions. As the example of Māori philosophy demonstrates, current philosophical practices seem to delimit the search for the unconventional in academic philosophy. Through its philosophical appropriation, the so-called unconventional tends to mimic conventional patterns in academic philosophy. We will then attempt to find reasons to critique this process within the Adornoian framework itself. The conclusion draws together different strands of the discussion and delineates some paths to take forward the world philosophies project in an Adornoian spirit. (shrink)

Michael Peters, Sonja Arndt & Marek TesarThis is a collective writing experiment of PESA members, including its Executive Committee, asking questions of the Philosophy of Education in a New Key. Co...

This article is concerned with developing a philosophical approach to a number of significant changes to academic publishing, and specifically the global journal knowledge system wrought by a range of new digital technologies that herald the third age of the journal as an electronic, interactive and mixed-media form of scientific communication. The paper emerges from an Editors' Collective, a small New Zealand-based organisation comprised of editors and reviewers of academic journals mostly in the fields of education and philosophy. The paper (...) is the result of a collective writing process. (shrink)

Being Indigenous and operating in an institution such as a university places us in a complex position. The premise of decolonizing history, literature, curriculum, and thought in general creates a tenuous space for Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples to confront a shared colonial condition. What does decolonization mean for Indigenous peoples? Is decolonization an implied promise to squash the tropes of coloniality? Or is it a way for non-Indigenous people to create another paradigm or site for their own resistance or transgression (...) of thinking? What are the roles of Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples in this space of educational potential, this curriculum called decolonization? This article presents a multi-vocal reflection on these and related questions. (shrink)

Carl Schmitt is one of the most influential political and legal theorists of the 20th century. His ideas have long been familiar to intellectuals in Europe. Despite growing interest in Schmitt, the analysis of the metaphysical structure and logic of Schmitt's political thought is still missing. This book tries to redress this flaw. It focuses on Schmitt's conception of the concrete, which is seen as the "metaphysical core" of his writings. For Schmitt, the concrete is a condition of possibility (...) of any order. Rather that a concept, it is a name for a borderline or a passage between a concept and life, between a mediating idea and an immediate existence. In addition to the structure and logic of Schmitt's thought, the book is a short presentation of all central themes in Schmitt's writings from Political Theology (1922) to The Nomos of the Earth (1950). (shrink)

During the formative years of National Socialist Germany, Carl Schmitt abandoned the decisionism he had been developing since the beginning of his career and turned toward institutionalism, known also as “concrete order thinking” and the philosophy of nomos. Schmitt had outlined his decisionist theory as a critical response to the normativist approach in legal positivism represented especially by Hans Kelsen. In Schmitt's understanding, normativism identified law (Recht) with legal rules and norms, dismissing the existential dimension of personal judgment and (...) decision in the theory of law.1 Schmitt's decisionism meant a revival of this existential dimension: “Law is concretized only in…. (shrink)

In Politics of Friendship Jacques Derrida reveals the core of Carl Schmitt's thinking concerning the political: “If thepolitical is to exist, one must know who everyone is, who is a friend and who is an enemy, and this knowing is not in the mode of theoretical knowledge but in one of apractical identification.”Nevertheless, the enemy, who actually isidentified, is not Carl Schmitt's real enemy. On the contrary, the identified enemy is his friend to the extent that it constitutes (...) by exclusion what is most important to Schmitt: the existence of the political, and thereby, the Volk. Schmitt's real enemy is, as I try to demonstrate in this article, anyone who is not identified, the anonymous “natural existence of groups of individuals who just happen to live together” (Schmitt). In Schmitt's Nazi-period this anonymous individual got a concrete—although still non-identified—content: an assimilated Jew. And although Schmitt thought that he was a Christian thinker, in the end of this article I argue that the very first assimilated Jew was indeed St Paul, and that his doctrine of the “life in Christ” can be taken as a point of departure for thinking politics beyond enemies and exclusion. (shrink)

What I relate is the history of the next two centuries. I describe what is coming, what can no longer come differently: the advent of nihilism. This history can be related even now; for necessity i...

Despite the reservations of many, digital spaces are useful and are here to stay. Most of us have witnessed that usefulness in action over the last two years, since the outbreak of COVID-19, and ma...

In line with his theory of secularization according to which all significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts, Carl Schmitt argues in Constitutional Theory that people’s (Volk) constitution-making power in modern democracy is analogical to God’s potestas constituens in medieval theology. It is also undoubtedly possible to find a resemblance between Schmitt’s constitution-making power and God’s power as it is described in medieval theology. In the same sense as the constitution-making power is absolutely (...) free from all normative ties, God’s potestas constituens, or rather, God’s potentia absoluta is free from such ties. Yet, unlike the Schmittian constitution-making power, God’s potentia absoluta was not, in medieval theology, originally intended as a description of some form of divine action: the absolute power of God referred to the total possibilities initially open to God. However, when the canonists started to employ the term potentia absoluta in their speculations concerning the papal plenitude of power (plenitude potestatis) by the end of the thirteenth century, they used it in a different sense than the theologians previously. According to certain canonists, the pope, by his potentia absoluta, could grant de facto dispensations from divine and ecclesiastical laws. Later on, this notion became a theological notion as well, but given its origin in juridical discourse, the constitution-making power, rather than being a secularized theological notion, is a theologized juristic notion. (shrink)

This contribution to the MLG-debate wants to focus on the question of legitimate authority for the use of military force in the framework of international interventions. More in particular, it is the main objective of this article to verify whether the international intervention in Former Yugoslavia was characterised by a sufficient legitimate authority quality. The analysis itself will be developed in two steps. In a first step, we will describe the three main approaches to the concept of the legitimate authority (...) in the post Cold War literature. Secondly, it is our intention to apply these three legitimate authority approaches in the context of the international intervention in Former Yugoslavia. The final results of this study allow us to formulate a rather remarkable conclusion from an ethical point ofview. Due to the reluctance of the international community to use military force, the central issue concerning the legitimate authority debate no longer seems to be "who among the many candidates has the right to intervene?", but rather 'who has the duty to do so?". (shrink)

https://revistes.uab.cat/enrahonar/article/view/v37-moulines.

Die »Enzyklopädie Philosophie- und Wissenschaftstheorie«, das größte allgemeine Nachschlagewerk zur Philosophie im deutschsprachigen Raum, wurde 1980 begonnen und 1996 mit dem vierten Band abgeschlossen. Sie erschien 2005 bis 2018 in einer komplett aktualisierten und erweiterten 8-bändigen Neuauflage, die hiermit nun in einer kartonierten Sonderausgabe vorliegt. Die »Enzyklopädie« umfasst in Sach- und Personenartikeln nicht nur den klassischen Bestand des philosophischen Wissens, sondern auch die neuere Entwicklung der Philosophie, insbesondere in den Bereichen Logik, Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie sowie Sprachphilosophie. Zugleich finden Grundlagenreflexionen in (...) den Wissenschaften und deren Geschichte ausführliche Berücksichtigung. Die umfassenden Bibliographien und Werkverzeichnisse wurden für die 2. Auflage in allen Artikeln auf den neuesten Stand gebracht. Der Herausgeber Jürgen Mittelstraß, Professor em. für Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie an der Universität Konstanz, ist einer der international renommiertesten deutschen Philosophen. 1989 erhielt er den Leibniz-Preis der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) und seitdem zahlreiche weitere Wissenschaftspreise sowie Ehrendoktorwürden. Er ist Direktor des Konstanzer Wissenschaftsforums, war Präsident der Academia Europaea (2002-2008) und Vorsitzender des Österreichischen Wissenschaftsrates (2005-2015). Band 1: A-B | Band 2: C-F | Band 3: G-Inn | Band 4: Ins-Loc | Band 5: Log-N | Band 6: O-Ra | Band 7: Re-Te | Band 8: Th-Z. (shrink)

Longtemps attendu, l'ouvrage restitue, pour la première fois en langue française, l'exégèse et l'interprétation complètes de l'œuvre publiée par Carl Schmitt de son vivant, dans ses champs et ses séquences, avant et après 1945. La première partie concerne la philosophie schmittienne du droit et sa fondation théologique: le 'décisionnisme' et 'l'institutionnalisme' ou 'pensée de l'ordre concret.' La deuxième partie porte sur la théorie du droit constitutionnel sous la République de Weimar, puis sous le IIIe Reich, ainsi que les commentaires (...) sur la Loi Fondamentale de Bonn. Autant d'éléments d'une analyse critique renouvelée de l'État de droit démocratique, parlementaire et pluraliste. La troisième partie traite du concept du politique, point d'articulation fondamental entre le droit constitutionnel et la théorie de l'État d'une part, le droit international et la théorie de la guerre d'autre part. La quatrième partie porte sur la doctrine du droit international sous Weimar, puis sous le IIIe Reich, enfin après 1945, dont la rétrospective du jus publicum europaeum. Une somme objective, exposant l'ensemble, donnant à chacun la possibilité de savoir, puis laissant à chacun le soin de juger."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Chantal Mouffe herneemt de centrale gedachte van Carl Schmitt dat de antagonistische relatie tussen vriend en vijand constitutief is voor het politieke. Anders dan bij Schmitt leidt die idee bij haar tot een links en radicaal democratisch model voor een pluralistische samenleving. Een juiste appreciatie van de niet te elimineren politieke dimensie van strijd geeft aanleiding tot een kritische evaluatie van het politieke liberalisme van John Rawls en de deliberatieve democratie van Jürgen Habermas. Tegelijkertijd werpt Mouffe daarbij een nieuw (...) licht op enkele recente politieke fenomenen, zoals de opkomst van rechtse populistische partijen in Europa en de internationale ‘oorlog tegen het terrorisme’. (shrink)

On the philosophical base of dialectical materialism.

On the philosophical base of dialectical materialism.

Die Studie versucht, das Politische als ein zwischenmenschliches Urteilshandeln zu erklären. Der Urteilstypus, der dem zugrundeliegen muß, wird systematisch ausgewiesen und - neben den Leuten selbst - der Philosophie, Politischen Theorie, Rechtswissenschaft und auch Theologie vorgelegt.Anlaß und Stoff für die Beweisführung bildet die Berliner Diskussion über die Möglichkeiten menschlicher Rationalität um J. G. Fichte und seine vielfältigen Kritiker, darunter Carl Schmitt. Durch die Art, wie der untersuchte Urteilstypus aus sich heraus Einheit und Kraft gewinnt und so kommunikativ zu wirken (...) vermag, ergibt sich ein neues Bild von Demokratie-Theorie: Das Politische ist wesentlich unvertretbar; die Urteilenden selber sinnen einander Einsatz an und rufen sich zur Entscheidung auf. So wird man Bürger.Im Sinn einer solchen nicht von bloß privaten Interessen bestimmten Gemeinschaftlichkeit wurde Fichte insbesondere in China aufgenommen, als es sich in Begegnung mit Berliner Philosophie zu erneuern begann. Das vorliegende Buch erinnert auch an dieses Stück gemeinsamer Zukunft. (shrink)

Vier invalshoeken, die met vier constanten van het oeuvre van Schmitt samenvallen, werden gekozen om zijn politiek bewogen leven te bespreken en de verscheidenheid en het controversiële karakter van zijn werken te presenteren: katholicisme, etatisme, nationalisme en antiliberalisme.

At the centre of the monograph (1984, first edition) lies a detailed interpretation and critique of the idea of the Good in the Republic. The main thesis of the interpretation runs as follows: The idea of the Good functions as a third item between thinking and being. The main purpose of the monograph is to introduce the systematic problem of the third item via the historical problem of the idea of the Good. The second, enlarged edition (1989) gives a new (...) reconstruction of an "exasperatingly difficult but ever fascinating topic" (H. Cherniss), that is, of the platonic theory of the ideal numbers and the two principles that were contained in the “so-called unwritten doctrines” (Aristotle). The final chapter gives new information on the reception of Plato's idea of the Good in P. Natorp and M. Heidegger. It also includes an updated bibliography. The third edition (2015) is a reprint of the second edition of 1989. Further remarks and an updated bibliography to 2005 are to be found in: - Ferber, Rafael (2005). Ist die Idee des Guten nicht transzendent oder ist sie es doch? Nochmals Platons ΕΠΕΚΕΙΝΑ ΤΗΣ ΟΥΣΙΑΣ. In: Barbaric Damir: Platon über das Gute und die Gerechtigkeit / Plato on Goodness and Justice / Platone sul Bene e sulla Giustizia. Würzburg, 149-174. - Ferber, Rafael / Damschen, Gregor (2015). Is the Idea of the Good Beyond Being? Plato's "epekeinea tês ousias" Revisted (Republic, 6, 509b8-10). In: Nails, Debra; Harold, Tarrant; Kajava, Mika; Salmenkivi, Eero. Second Sailing: Alternative Perspectives on Plato. Espoo, 197-203. (shrink)

At the centre of the monograph (1984, first edition) lies a detailed interpretation and critique of the idea of the Good in the Republic. The main thesis of the interpretation runs as follows: The idea of the Good functions as a third item between thinking and being. The main purpose of the monograph is to introduce the systematic problem of the third item via the historical problem of the idea of the Good. The second, enlarged edition (1989) gives a new (...) reconstruction of an "exasperatingly difficult but ever fascinating topic" (H. Cherniss), that is, of the platonic theory of the ideal numbers and the two principles that were contained in the “so-called unwritten doctrines” (Aristotle). The final chapter gives new information on the reception of Plato's idea of the Good in P. Natorp and M. Heidegger. It also includes an updated bibliography. The third edition (2015) is a reprint of the second edition of 1989. Further remarks and an updated bibliography to 2005 are to be found in: - Ferber, Rafael (2005). Ist die Idee des Guten nicht transzendent oder ist sie es doch? Nochmals Platons ΕΠΕΚΕΙΝΑ ΤΗΣ ΟΥΣΙΑΣ. In: Barbaric Damir: Platon über das Gute und die Gerechtigkeit / Plato on Goodness and Justice / Platone sul Bene e sulla Giustizia. Würzburg, 149-174. - Ferber, Rafael / Damschen, Gregor (2015). Is the Idea of the Good Beyond Being? Plato's "epekeinea tês ousias" Revisted (Republic, 6, 509b8-10). In: Nails, Debra; Harold, Tarrant; Kajava, Mika; Salmenkivi, Eero. Second Sailing: Alternative Perspectives on Plato. Espoo, 197-203. (shrink)